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The  first  antidumping  legislation  adopted  in  the United  States  [US],  as  contained  in
Sections  800-801  of the Revenue  Act of 1916,  came  largely in  response  to the  alleged
dumping threat  from the highly cartelized  and heavily protected  German  industries  (Viner
1966).  This alleged dumping activity took the form of unloading excess industrial capacity
from the German cartels on to the noncartelized US market.  Inspired by this fear, the original
intent of the law was to provide protection for US firms against "unfair competition"  resulting
from the dumping activity of cartelized firms abroad.  Antidumping  [AD]  law today seems
to elicit much broader usage because of explicit changes in US AD law.  Under the original
US law, predatory intent had to be shown to establish a finding of dumping.  However, the
Revenue Act of 1921  dropped this intent requirement.  As currently administered  under US
Trade  Law,  dumping  is  defined  as foreign products  exported  to the US  market  at prices
below "fair value,"  that is, either below the prices of comparable  products  for sale in the
domestic market of the exporting country or below costs of production.
Although it is  difficult,  and most economists would even  say impossible,  to justify this
form of AD on economic theory grounds, the question we would like to address is whether
or not the existing law is utilized by domestic firms in the manner in which it was intended.'
The steadily lower US tariff levels that have been negotiated  in the post-WWII period have
made AD  suit activity  an increasingly  popular  way to  obtain temporary  protection  from
foreign competition that is harmful to a domestic  industry.  Because  all foreign competition
has the potential to harm the import-competing  domestic industry, the use and potential  abuse
of  US  AD  law  is  a  central  concern in both  multilateral  and  bilateral  trade negotiations.
Consequently, this paper will describe strategies a domestic  industry might have for filing an
antidumping  suit.  Because it is difficult,  if not impossible,  to describe what constitutes  abuse
of AD law given the definition of dumping cited above, we focus on two general  classes  of
strategies for filing an AD suit.  The first strategy is closer in spirit to the original intent of US
AD law.  The second strategy is closer to what might be called abuse of AD law.  The paper
will then summarize the empirical evidence as it relates each of these rationales for all 4-digit
Standard Industrial Code [SIC] US manufacturing  industries facing  import competition over
the period  1980-1985.  Given  this  evidence,  we then  discuss  the  specific  aspects  of the
International Trade Commission [ITC] injury determination  process which enable abuses  of
AD  law  to  occur.  We  argue  that  among  the  two  general  approaches  used  by  ITC
Commissioners  to determine injury, the historically  most popular approach is particularly
'Equating dumping with international predatory pricing is the only  economic  rationale for the
existence  of  US  antidumping  law  that  has  received  any  support  from  economists.
Unfortunately, this defintion of dumping led to very few  suits filed immediately following  the
enactment of the Antidumping Act of 1916 because  of the difficulty of establishing predatory
intent (Congressional  Budget  Office  1994, p. 20)
227hospitable  to a filing strategy that is contrary to the original  intent of AD law.  The other
general approach for determining injury, which until recently has been less popular with ITC
Commissioners,  makes this filing strategy far more difficult to pursue.  We conclude that with
only slight modifications to the ITC injury determination process, the potential  for abuse of
antidumping law of form we describe should be reduced  substantially.
A simple view of how  AD law restricts trade is that trade flows are  affected only when
AD duties are imposed.  In order to distinguish empirically between filing strategies that are
consistent  with  the  intent  of  AD  law  and  those  that  are  not,  we  must  take  a  more
comprehensive  view  of the  impacts  of  an  AD  suit  petition.  Several  researchers  have
challenged the  simple view,  arguing that  the threat  or mere  possibility  of duties  can  also
restrict trade.  In Staiger and Wolak (1994), we studied three possible channels through which
indirect effects may arise which when combined with the direct  effects of duties, we believe
capture most of the trade effects of antidumping  law.2  We refer to the three non-duty  effects
as  the  "investigation  effect,"  the  "suspension  effect,"  and  the  "withdrawal  effect."
Investigation  effects occur when an AD investigation takes place;  suspension effects  occur
under so-called "suspension  agreements"  (where an investigation  is suspended in exchange
for a promise by foreign firms to stop dumping);  and withdrawal  effects occur after  a petition
is simply withdrawn without a final determination.
This focus on the broader trade effects of AD law allows us to  distinguish between  two
general strategies for AD suit activity, the "outcome filing strategy" and  "the process filing
strategy."  Outcome filers are those firms who appear motivated by the expectation that they
can  secure  a finding of dumping.  Alternatively,  process  filers  file petitions largely for the
trade-restricting  effects generated  by the investigation  process  alone.  We argue  that the
outcome filing strategy is consistent with the intent of  AD law and therefore  does not qualify
as abuse.  In addition, we argue that it would be difficult to misuse AD law if the petitioner's
ultimate goal is to obtain AD duties because of the specific directives  given to the ITC on
how  to arrive  at the final  injury  determination  necessary  for an affirmative  final  dumping
determination.  On the other hand, process filing constitutes abuse of AD law.  Firms using
this strategy do not file in expectation of obtaining  a positive final injury determination but
only  for the  temporary  import-restricting  and  domestic  output-enhancing  effects  of  an
ongoing AD suit investigation.
US Antidumping Law
Before describing the details of the US dumping investigation procedure, we make several
preliminary  observations.  First, there  are  two  findings  necessary  for a  determination  of
dumping under US law:  i]  sales of imports at less than fair value [LTFV]; and  ii] material
2There  is  a  growing  empirical  literature  concerned with the determinants  and  impacts  of
antidumping petitions.  See, for example, Finger; Hernander and Schwartz  (1986);  Salvatore;
Hartigan, Kamma  and Perry; Messerlin (1989,  1990); Lichtenberg and Tan; Harrison;  and
Prusa.
228injury to the domestic industry due to these imports.  One government agency is assigned to
each  of these determinations--the  ITC  determines  injury  to the domestic  industry and the
Commerce  Department's  International  Trade  Administration  [ITA]  makes  the  LTFV
determination.  Second,  for each of these decisions, there is a preliminary and final decision
made by each agency.  The statutory time allotted  for the entire investigation ranges from 10
months to up to 14 months under special circumstances.  Figure 1 summarizes  the timing of
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Figure 1.  "Typical" course of an antidumping investigation.
'International  Trade Administration,  Commerce Department.
'International  Trade Commission.
Investigation Procedure
Once an AD petition is filed with the Commerce Department's ITA and with the ITC, the
229ITC  Preliminary  Injury Determination:  If  the petition determination  is affirmative, the ITC
then has 45 days to make a preliminary determination of whether the industry under review
is  "materially  injured,"  or "threatened  with material  injury,"  or if the establishment of the
industry "is materially retarded" as a result of the imports under investigation.  If the ITC's
preliminary  determination  is negative,  the investigation  is terminated  as Figure  1 indicates.
If the ITC's preliminary determination is affirmative,  as it was for 86 percent of the products
investigated between  1980-85,  then the investigation will run its course unless the petitioner
takes action to terminate or suspend the case.
ITA  Preliminary  LTFV Determination:  Provided  the ITC's  preliminary  determination  is
affirmative,  and  within  160  days  of the initial  filing of the  suit  (or  within  90  days if all
interested  parties  agree to  a "waiver  of verification"),  the ITA must  make  a preliminary
determination of whether there is reasonable evidence that merchandise "is being  sold, or is
likely to be sold at less than fair value."4  A negative preliminary  determination  by the ITA
does  not  terminate  the  investigation.  If the  preliminary  determination  of the  ITA  is
affirmative,  then the ITA must provide  an estimate of the "dumping  margin."  ITA is  also
required to  order the "suspension of liquidation"  of the affected  imported goods  and the
posting by importers of a cash deposit or bond to cover the estimated dumping duties payable
pending the final outcome of  the investigation.  ITA reached  an affirmative determination for
93  percent  of  the  products  whose  investigations  made  it  past  the  preliminary  injury
determination over the period  1980-85.
At  any  point  after  the  ITA's  preliminary  determination,  the  investigation  may  be
terminated or suspended,  or it may continue on to the final determination.  Termination prior
to the final determination occurs if and only if the petition  is withdrawn  by the petitioner.
This action was taken for 42 percent of the products whose investigations made it past the
preliminary injury determination  during the 1980-85 period, with a large portion taken in the
steel industry.  Termination usually comes about  as a result of price agreements reached by
the domestic industry and foreign firms named in the suit.
Suspension occurs if the foreign firms that are the subject of the dumping allegation reach
an agreement with the ITA to i] eliminate LTFV sales to the US market,  ii] cease exporting
to the  US  market  completely,  or  iii]  under  "extraordinary  circumstances,"  eliminate  the
"injurious effect" of their actions, including any margin of "underselling" (i.e.,  undercutting
the price of the domestic  product), without necessarily  raising price so high as to eliminate
the full margin of dumping.  Such agreements were  negotiated for 2 percent  of the products
4In  "extraordinarily  complicated"  cases,  the  ITA  may  postpone  making  its  preliminary
determination until the 210th day after filing.
5Agreements between foreign firms and domestic petitioners are permitted under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine which  exempts such parties from prosecution under US antitrust law.
However,  direct  conversations  between  domestic  and foreign  firms concerning  prices  or
quantities would not be protected.  Consequently, settlements are typically negotiated through
the Commerce Department.  See Prusa (1992)  for a thorough analysis of this exemption  and
its implications for the effects of antidumping law.
230whose investigations made it past the preliminary  injury determination during the 1980-85
period.  In the case of suspension,  any violation  of the agreement  will result  in automatic
renewal of the investigation.
ITA Final LTFV Determination:  If the case is neither terminated nor suspended, then the ITA
must within 75 days of its preliminary  determination make a final determination  of whether
the merchandise under investigation  "is being,  or is likely to be"  sold in the US  at less than
fair value.6
ITC  Final  Injury  Determination:  If the  ITA's  preliminary  and  final  determination  are
affirmative  then, as depicted in Figure 1, the ITC must make its final determination  of injury
within 45 days of  the ITA's final determination  (or within 120 days of the ITA's preliminary
determination,  whichever is later).  If the ITA's preliminary determination is negative,  and its
final determination is affirmative,  then the ITC has 75 days from the ITA's affirmative final
determination to make its final determination  of injury.
Lastly, if the final determinations of both the ITA and ITC are affirmative,  the ITA has
seven days within which to instruct customs officers to assess the appropriate  AD duties.
Assessment of dumping duties occurred for 35  percent of the products whose investigations
made it past the preliminary injury determination over the period  1980-85.  If either the ITC
or the ITA final determination is negative, the investigation is terminated,  an outcome which
occurred for 21  percent of the products whose investigations  made it past the preliminary
injury determination over the 1980-85  period.
Assessment of AD Duties:  Provided that the final determinations of injury and LTFV sales
are both affirmative  the "definitive"  dumping margins for purposes of assessing AD duties
must then be calculated.  These calculations are made on the basis of the prices of the imports
to which they will apply (as opposed to the margins calculated for the LTFV determination,
which are based on a sample of imports over an historic period which typically covers the six
months preceding the initiation of the petition).  The final assessment of AD duties applies
retroactively  only if the preliminary  LTFV  determination  was  affirmative.  In this  case,
antidumping duties would normally be assessed  on the relevant imports from the date of the
preliminary  LTFV  determination  forward.  However,  if the  industry  alleges  "critical
circumstances"  and the ITA and ITC find evidence both that there are "massive" imports of
the relevant  product over a "relatively  short period"  which cause material  injury, and that
there is either a history of dumping in the industry or that importers were or should have been
knowledgeable  about ongoing dumping, the dumping duties can be applied retroactively 90
days prior to the preliminary LTFV finding.7
6The  ITA may  postpone  its  final  determination  until the  135th day  after  its preliminary
determination if requested  to do so by either the petitioner or the firms against which the
dumping allegations were made.
7In  practice, however, the conditions for critical circumstances are rarely met.
231Thus,  there are,  in effect,  three possible ranges of imports to which antidumping  duties
may  apply  once  an  affirmative  final  determination  is  made.  If the  preliminary  LTFV
determination was negative, duties equal to the actual dumping margins will be imposed  on
the  relevant  imports  entering  the  US  on  or  after  the  date  of final  determination.  If,
alternatively,  the  preliminary  LTFV  determination  was  affirmative,  antidumping  duties
reflecting actual dumping margins will be imposed on imports entering the US  either i] on or
after the date of the preliminary LTFV determination,  or ii] in the case of critical circumstanc-
es, 90 days prior to the date of the preliminary LTFV determination.
Investigation  Effects
Dale (1980,  pp.  85-86) discusses two possible reasons for the existence  of investigation
effects associated with AD petitions.  The first focuses on the pricing behavior of exporters.
As discussed above, when the final injury and dumping determinations  are positive and where
the  preliminary  LTFV  determination  is  also  affirmative,  duties  are  typically  imposed
retroactively  on imports that enter the US  after the date of the preliminary LTFV finding.
The "definitive"  margin on which these duties are based is recalculated to reflect the actual
dumping  margins for imports  entering  after this date.  Thus,  an exporter  who receives  an
affirmative  preliminary  LTFV  determination  and  expects  the  final  determination  to  be
affirmative  can nonetheless reduce AD duties,  or even avoid them altogether, by raising the
price  on  goods  exported  after  the  preliminary  LTFV  determination  date.  Under  these
circumstances,  we expect an affirmative  preliminary LTFV finding would lead to a sharp drop
in the rate of imports and to a rise in prices, with these effects lasting for the remainder of the
investigation.  Moreover,  the rate of imports might be expected to rise somewhat  with the
filing of a petition in anticipation of its future fall.8
A second  explanation for investigation  effects focuses on the importers of the products
under investigation.  US law requires that AD duties be imposed on the importer rather than
on foreign exporters.9  As such,  an affirmative preliminary LTFV finding places the importer
at considerable risk in terms of  liability for future duty payments on any imports purchased
after that date.  Again, this suggests that an affirmative preliminary  LTFV finding,  coupled
with an expectation that the final determination will be affirmative would  lead to a sharp drop
in the rate of imports and to a rise in prices, with these effects lasting for the remainder of the
investigation. 0  Again, the rate of imports might, if anything, rise when a petition is filed in
8As discussed above,  a sufficiently large  increase in the flow of imports between the date a
petition was filed and the date of a preliminary LTFV determination could trigger the "critical
circumstances"  provisions  of US  antidumping  law  which  allow  duties  to  be  imposed
retroactively back to the date of filing.
9Exporters are allowed to reimburse importers for duty payments only if the agreement to
purchase was made before the preliminary LTFV determination  and where the products are
exported before the final dumping determination (Dale 1980, p.  105).
1°Anecdotal  support  for the  trade-restricting  effects  of preliminary  dumping  findings  is
common.  For example,  in reference to a US antidumping petition brought by the National
Knitwear & Sportswear Association against sweater producers in Hong Kong,  South Korea,
232anticipation of its future fall.  For both of  these investigation  effects to be credible,  the foreign
competitor  must  regard  the  eventual  imposition  of  duties  as  a  significant  possibility.
Consequently,  we expect both of these kinds of investigation effects to be associated  with the
outcome filing strategy.
A third alternative to the two interpretations of investigation effects put forward by Dale
does not require a significant possibility of eventual  duties in order to make  it credible.  For
this reason, we associate these investigation  effects with the process  filing  strategy.  This
strategy supposes that domestic firms use the AD investigation to dampen competition during
times when costly price wars might otherwise erupt (see Staiger and Wolak 1991  and  1994). 1
A formal  treatment of the  anti-competitive  effects of  AD  investigations  centers  on four
features of AD law:  i] the preliminary finding of injury, which is both necessary and  sufficient
to ensure that the investigation will run its year-long course unless the petitioner chooses to
stop it, is relatively  easy to secure since the ITC typically relies  on information provided  by
the  petitioner  at  this  preliminary  stage  of the  investigation;  ii]  price-cutting  during  the
investigation  period  by foreign firms  named in the petition will  raise the  likelihood of an
affirmative dumping determination,  iii] the prospect that foreign firms will face AD duties  if
they cut prices during the investigation period will reduce their incentive to do  so; and iv] the
competition-dampening  investigation  effect  noted  in  iii]  is  only  secured  by  filing  the
antidumping petition.
Of these four points, ii] is the least  self-evident, and requires  some elaboration here.  A
crucial step in the historically most popular method used by the ITC to determine injury--the
trends analysis or bifurcation approach--requires  establishing  a causal link between dumped
imports  and  injury to the domestic  industry.  Here,  the  ITC relies  heavily on evidence  of
"underselling,"  that is, sales of the imported good in the domestic market  at a price below that
of the domestically produced "like product,"  and of a relationship  between such underselling
and increases in foreign market share.  Moreover,  in its final determination of injury, the ITC
routinely considers data that become available during the period of investigation.  Thus, were
a foreign firm to cut its price in the domestic  market during the period of investigation and
gain market share, this would increase the likelihood of an ITC finding of increased foreign
and Taiwan,  The New York Times observes:
The [preliminary dumping]  margins were announced  as retailers  are about to place
orders  for  delivery next  fall.  Some  industry officials  said  prospects  of higher
prices, or just the uncertainty  over what the new price levels would be,  could cause
some  retailers to  switch to domestic  suppliers (The New  York Times, April 24,
1990, p. Cl).
1 lit is worth noting that the use of antidumping law as a tool to avoid price wars with foreign
rivals has been explicitly documented  in at least one instance.  In January  1938, the South
African Iron and Steel Corporation filed an antidumping petition against steel producers in
the US for selling steel in the South African market at prices below those agreed upon by the
International Steel Cartel.  Dumping duties were levied and the Cartel's pricing arrangements
restored (see Hexner 1943).  Less direct evidence of  firms turning to antidumping law to avert
price wars is provided by Messerlin (1990)  for the European Community chemical industry.
233market share by reason of "underselling," and would  consequently  raise the likelihood  of a
final determination of injury and the prospect of AD  duties.
Under these four points, we have argued (Staiger and Wolak  1991)  that the filing of an
AD  petition can  dampen competition  and lead to greater market share for domestic  firms
during the entire period of investigation.  These investigation  effects  occur because by filing
an AD  petition,  the domestic  industry is able to diminish the incentives  for foreign firms to
aggressively  pursue domestic  market share while the investigation  is proceeding.  Hence,  with
aggressive  pricing policies  now relatively  less  attractive for foreign firms,  higher  domestic
prices (and lower  imports).can be maintained even  as domestic  firms increase output.
Suspension and Withdrawal Effects
The imposition of AD duties is not the only way that AD  proceedings  can have  a lasting
effect  on post-investigation  import flows.  Suspension agreements,  negotiated between  the
ITA and foreign firms named in the AD petition, are clearly meant to  have lasting impacts  on
import prices and volumes,  and are monitored and enforced by the ITA to ensure that they
do  have  such  effects.  The  intent  of  a  suspension  agreement  is  to  provide  a  non-duty
alternative  by which  previous  dumping  activities  can be  halted.  Therefore,  it would  be
surprising if  there were not a "suspension effect"  in the data.  A prominent example  involving
such a suspension  agreement (though not falling in our sample  period) was the  1986  US-
Japan Semiconductor  Trade Arrangement.
Petitions which are withdrawn by the domestic  industry prior to a final  determination are
simply terminated.  It might seem,  a priori, that a petition withdrawal should  allow  import
flows  to continue at (or return to) pre-investigation  levels just as in a negative  determination.
Prusa has provided a bargaining model  which overturns this, a priori, view.  According  to
Prusa, the AD  investigation  process provides the domestic firms with both a threat of AD
duties  against their foreign  rivals as well  as cover from  domestic  antitrust laws  under the
Noerr-Pennington  doctrine.  This  allows  domestic  firms  to  coordinate  on  a more  trade-
restrictive arrangement with foreign firms which is then implemented  upon the withdrawal of
the AD petition.  Therefore  a withdrawn petition could  have lasting effects  on imports if the
investigation process  allows  foreign  and domestic  firms  to coordinate  output or prices in
subsequent periods.
The suspension and withdrawal effects  do not help to distinguish between  the process  and
outcome  filing  strategies, because we  expect  process  filers to be primarily interested in the
reduction of import flows  associated  with an ongoing  investigation.  However,  we would  not
expect the magnitude of either the suspension or withdrawal effect  to be particularly large for
process filers when compared to the magnitude of these same  effects  for outcome  filers.
Filing Strategies
It is natural to think of filing activity as reflecting the desire to secure a finding of dumping
and the explicit remedies under the law that such a finding would bring forth; i.e.,  AD duties
or a suspension agreement in lieu of duties.  We call firms that pursue such a filing strategy
234"outcome  filers."  However,  the potential  for the investigation  and  withdrawal  effects  as
described  above leads to the possibility of another filing strategy where firms file "meritless"
AD petitions just to trigger the process.  We call firms that pursue this second  filing strategy
"process  filers."
For the process filing strategy to make sense, two logical conditions must hold.  First, the
AD investigation process itself must be obtainable even when a full investigation would not
be warranted on the merits of the case.  And second, the significant possibility of a dumping
finding can not be a prerequisite for the sought-after  investigation and/or withdrawal  effects.
The first condition is likely to be met given the strict 45-day time limit within which the ITC
must make the preliminary injury determination,  a time constraint which forces the ITC to rely
heavily on information provided by petitioners at this stage of the investigation.  Thus, firms
that want the AD investigation process should find it relatively  easy to obtain, regardless of
the merits of their dumping  claims.
However,  what the process itself is worth when the case against foreign firms is weak is
less clear.  Dale's interpretations of the outcome filer investigation effects imply that petitions
which were known by the industry to have little chance of resulting in a finding of dumping
would be unlikely to have  strong trade-restricting  effects associated with the investigation
process.  The explanations underlying Dale's interpretations  presume a significant  probability
of a  final affirmative  dumping  determination.  In contrast,  the  significant  possibility  of a
dumping finding  is not a prerequisite for the investigation  effects under the process  filing
strategy.  This is because the investigation effect under this interpretation comes in the form
of a threat to "punish" or "harass" foreign firms with an AD duty if they should "misbehave"
and compete too aggressively during the investigation period.  Such a threat is made credible
by filing the petition; because it is credible, the threatened duties need never be implemented.
Thus, domestic firms may value the price-competition-dampening  effects  of AD investigations
for their own sake.  Hence, these firms  may file  such petitions with no expectation that they
would  actually result in duties or other remedies,  but only to ensure that the foreign firms do
not engage  in aggressive pricing behavior  during the investigation phase.
Outcome filers file AD petitions when their chances of securing  a dumping determination
are sufficiently strong.  The investigation effect associated with such filers should correspond
to the first two interpretations  depicted above: the flow of imports should rise upon filing and
fall  at the point of an affirmative  preliminary  LTFV determination,  remaining low until the
conclusion  of the investigation.  Process  filers  file  AD  petitions without  regard  to their
chances of securing a dumping determination, but rather when the risks of competitive  price
wars are sufficiently severe.  In Staiger and Wolak (1991),  we argue that this occurs when
capacity utilization falls below a critical level, and thus we will consider the role of capacity
utilization  as  a predictor of the filing  activity of process  filers.  The investigation  effects
associated with process filers should correspond to the third interpretation  depicted above:
the  flow  of imports  should  fall  upon  filing  and  remain  low until  the  conclusion  of the
investigation.
235Summary of Evidence  on Process  and Outcome  Filing Strategies
The empirical work in Staiger and Wolak (1994) focused on  1980 to 1985,  because major
changes in the structure of US AD law occurred with the passage of  The Trade Agreement
Act of 1979.  Modifications of this act were made by The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, but
none of these are  directly relevant to the aspects  of the  administrative process we consider
here.
Data  Sources
The  source for the industry-level  economic magnitudes  used for the work reported  in
Staiger and Wolak (1994) is the National Bureau of Economic Research  Trade Data File.  It
contains  domestic shipments,  imports and exports,  information  for 450 US  manufacturing
industries by 4-digit  1972  SIC from 1958 to  1985.  It also contains information on various
industry-level economic aggregates  such as the level of employment and the size of the capital
stock,  as well  as  an industry-level  output  price  deflator.  We  used  this price  deflator to
convert all nominal dollar magnitudes to 1972 dollars.
The data source for information on the filing date for all antidumping suits and the dates
for the subsequent stages of the suit resolution process is the National Technical Information
Service's  Trade Action Monitoring  System  [TAMS] Pending  Investigation  Report.  For
purposes  of the  investigation,  the  ITC  links  the  products  under  investigation  to  Tariff
Schedules of the United States [TSUS]  product codes.  Thus, for each petition the TAMS
dataset records the TSUS codes for the products which are allegedly being dumped  and the
petition's  disposition in the current  month.  We also obtained  a year-by-year  concordance
between  TSUS product codes  and  1972  SICs from the Commerce Department's  Foreign
Trade Division Imports Extract Master Concordance.  This concordance allows us to assign
each  antidumping  suit filed to a 4-digit  SIC industry.  Staiger  and Wolak  (1994)  discuss
further details on the datasets used.
Econometric Modeling Framework
Our econometric  model characterizes  the joint distribution  of three variables--suit  filing
activity,  imports,  and domestic output--for  each  import-competing  industry from  1980 to
1985.  This distribution is  conditional  on the unobserved  filing  strategy  pursued by  each
specific industry.  The primary motivation for  estimating filing  equations jointly with the
import  and  domestic output equations  is to examine  potential existence,  as outlined in the
preceding  section,  of two  distinct AD  suit  filing  strategies.  Although  the  specific  filing
strategy  pursued by  a firm  is unobservable,  each  filing  strategy implies  a  different  set of
predictors  of future  filing  activity  and  different  impacts  of the various stages  of the  suit
resolution process on domestic output and imports.  We use these differences in behavior to
infer differences  in filing strategies across industries.
For each filing strategy we specify the same joint distribution of filings over our sample
period.  The only difference between the filing equations estimated for the two filing strategies
is what variables enter into the conditional mean of filings for a each year and industry.  Let
236feit  be the number  of AD  suits filed in industry i for good g in period  t, where  g=l,...,Q,
t=1,...,T and i=1,...,N.  Because AD suits are filed at the TSUS code level,  for the purposes
of this paper a good are defined by TSUS product codes.  The vector Xt  is composed of the
observable characteristics  of industry i as of the beginning time t which affect the distribution
of  filings in that industry during that time period.  The discrete conditional  distribution for  fit
given  Xt depends  on  a different X.  for  each  filing  strategy.  We  aggregate  over kill  G
products in a SIC industry i during time period t to obtain the conditional  distribution of fit,
the number of filings in industry i during time period t.  Using this conditional  distribution, we
then  compute the joint distribution  of ft  for t=1980  to  1985.  Staiger  and  Wolak (1994)
describes this process in detail.
The model of the impact of the AD process on industry-level  imports and output first
specifies  the  product  class  import  equations  and  output  prediction  equations  and  then
aggregates these to obtain the industry-level equations.  Let IMPit denote the level of imports
for product  class g  in industry i in time period  t.  Let  OUTgi  denote the  level  of output
produced domestically in product class g in industry i in time period t.  We treat time period
t as the interval  of time (t, t + 1).
The goal of the Staiger and Wolak (1994) framework is to measure the within-year effects
of the stages of the AD suit resolution process from annual magnitudes.  To do this, we first
specified  models for the rate of imports  and domestic  output within any  given year.  The
models incorporated how each of  the stages of the suit resolution process impacts the rate of
change  in imports  and domestic  output.  We then aggregated  these two  within-year flow
equations  to  obtain the annual level of imports and domestic  output.  Aggregating  these
TSUS  code-level  total  annual  import  and  competing  domestic  output  equations  over  all
products in each 4-digit SIC yields equations which can be estimated using our industry-level
data.  This across-product  aggregation  process  clarifies precisely  how  our  industry-level
annual indexes of dumping suit activity are constructed  from the product-level indexes.
The conditional mean functions  for industry-level imports and output, normalized  by the
number of products in the industry during time period t (MP/Git and OUTi/Git,  respectively),
for our joint outcome and process filing strategies model are:
=  pk*  +  +  P 'OGPI/G  +  +OGPLFV/Gt  +  P  OGSUS 1/G,,
+ P4'OGWD,/G  +  PBOGD,/G.  (1)
where k=m,o (for imports and output) and j=O,P (for outcome and process filers), where
OGPgt  f  OG  (s)  ds  OGPLFV  g i t   OtL(s)ds
,  OGSUS  git=  _ 
I OGSUS (s)ds




Each of these five variables  is the sum over the associated variable  aggregated over the
Git TSUS products in industry i for year t.  The variables Igtk(s),  (k=OGP,  OGPLFV, OGSUS,
OGWD, and OGD) count, respectively, the number of currently ongoing AD petitions (OGP),
ongoing affirmative preliminary LTFV determinations (OGPLFV),  ongoing suspended  suits
(OGSUS),  ongoing withdrawn  suits (OGWD),  and ongoing  duties (OGD) for all s e  [t,t+1)
in product class g in industry i and time period t.  The variable  Igit°P(s) turns on at the filing
date of the suit and remains on until the suit's final disposition date.  The variable  IgitOGPLFV(s)
remains on from the date of the affirmative preliminary  LTFV decision until the suit's final
disposition date.  The final disposition of a suit is determined by one of the following four
events:  1] a negative final determination,  2] the imposition of duties,  3] the suspension of the
investigation,  or 4] the withdrawal of the suit by the petitioner.  Using this variable we can
construct the integrated,  industry-aggregate  indexes of activity in each of these portions of
the suit filing process for year t.  The variable IgitGSUS(s)  remains on as long as there is an
ongoing  suspension  agreement  for product  g  in industry  i during  period  t.  The  variable
IgitoGWD(s) remains on as long as there is an ongoing withdrawal agreement  for product g in
industry i during period t.  The variable  IgitOGD(s)  remains  on as  long  as there  is ongoing
dumping duties imposed  on product g in industry  i during period  t.  The coefficients  ftki,
(i=1,2...5, k=o,m) quantify the impact of a one unit change in these count variables on the
annual  rate of change  in imports and output in industry i during time period t for outcome
filers ifj=O and for process filers ifj=P.
For each filing strategy, we specified  a joint distribution for IMPi/Git  and  OUTiJGit,  which
we then used to compute the joint density of these variables for t=1980 to 1985.  We then
combined this joint density with that for fjt  for the same filing  strategy and time period.  We
introduce unobserved heterogeneity into the conditional mean functions for these  18 variables
(3  variables--filings,  imports,  and  domestic  output--for  6  years)  to  account  for  both
contemporaneous  correlation between filings, imports and output within the same industry,
and correlation  over time between these  same variables for the same industry.
We now discuss the variables entering Xt  for each filing strategy.  For the outcome filing
strategy,  candidate  variables  for inclusion  in  Xit are those used  to  determine  injury  in  an
antidumping suit proceeding.  Since filers are interested  in eventually obtaining duties, they
will rationally file based on the values of these variables.  Although the domestic industry
must concern itself with the establishment of injury,  a determination of LTFV sales by the
foreign firm is also necessary for dumping to be found.  Moreover, the margin of final sales
in the domestic market relative to LTFV, as found by the Commerce Department,  determines
the magnitude of the antidumping duties that the petitioning industry can expect.
The Commerce Department's final LTFV margin is extremely unpredictable and there are
biases  inherent  in the process  used to  determine  its level which favor finding  a  positive
margin.  This uncertainty is due in part to different methodologies, sometimes for a single suit,
238that can be used to determine this margin.  Boltuck and Litan contains several papers which
discuss the large amount of uncertainty inherent in the dumping margin determination  process.
The two papers by Francois,  Palmeter,  and Anspacher and Boltuck, Francois, and Kaplan in
the Boltuck and Litan volume are particularly  persuasive in concluding that there are strong
biases in the process towards finding a positive dumping margin.  For all of these reasons, we
hypothesize  that firms  file primarily  based  on the  observable  industry  characteristics  that
determine injury.  We  allow a sufficiently rich stochastic structure  in our model to account
for unobservable  differences in filing behavior across industries.  The  sample frequencies  of
the preliminary and final LTFV determinations are consistent with the view that the LTFV
standard is not very difficult to meet.
A  major  indicator  of injury  to  the  petitioning  firms  is  the  import  penetration  ratio
[IMPENit = IMPJ(IMPit + OUTit)].  A large value for IMPEN is indicative  of a large foreign
presence in the domestic  market which may be injurious  to the domestic  firms.  A second
variable which is used to assess injury is the domestic firm's capacity utilization rate, which
we represent at the industry level by CAPUit = OUTt/CAPit (where OUTit is real  shipments
and CAP,t is real capital  stock).  We include IMPENit-1 and CAPUit_ 1 in Xt, because they are
both predetermined  as of the beginning of year t.  We also include time fixed effects in Xit to
account  for  any trends  in  filing  activity not  accounted  for  by changes  in  observable  or
unobservable  industry  characteristics.  Finally,  we  include  several  additional  variables  to
account  for the fact that the  magnitude of IMPEN and  CAPU  necessary  to find  harmful
dumping may vary with the size and the structure of the domestic industry.  See Staiger and
Wolak (1994)  for details.
For the process  filing strategy,  the theoretical results discussed  in "Antidumping  Law"
guide our selection of variables to include in the filing rate model.  These results imply that
process  filers  decide  to  initiate  antidumping  suits  based  purely  on  the level  of capacity
utilization in their industry.  Consequently, the filing rate function for the joint distribution of
filings,  imports,  and  output  for the  process  filing  strategy  should  contain  only  capacity
utilization.  The theory gives no guidance concerning the dynamics of the impact  of capacity
utilization on filing.  We included lags of capacity  utilization up to the point where the null
hypothesis  of excluding  further  lags  could  not be  rejected.  This  led  to the inclusion  of
CAPUit.1  and CAPUit-2.
Because the filing strategy used by a firm is unobservable,  we needed to allow for this in
our  econometric model  of filings, imports,  and output.  In Staiger  and Wolak (1994)  we
argued that there are observable variables that should increase the probability  a given industry
is using the process filing strategy versus the outcome filing strategy.  We  specified the filing
strategy used by an industry for  our entire sample time period as  a latent indicator  (0-1)
random variable yi, where yi = 1 if the industry uses the process filing strategy and yi = 0 if the
industry uses the  outcome filing  strategy.  The probability that y, takes on the value  1 is
assumed to depend on observable and unobservable  industry characteristics at the beginning
of our sample period.
Several of these characteristics  are meant to reflect variation in the cost of using AD law
across industries.  The process filing strategy, whose benefits are relatively short-lived, is less
239likely to be chosen by industries with high filing costs.  The first characteristic is the beginning
of the sample degree of unionization in the industry.  All firms in an industry benefit from the
protection provided by an AD suit, but only those firms  filing the suit bear the costs.  We
expect more highly unionized industries to have higher probabilities of being process filers.
A  strong  union  presence  in  an  industry  provides  additional  organizations  to  assist  in
overcoming the coordination and cost-sharing problems associated with filing an AD  suit on
behalf of the  industry.  The  second factor  is  the size  of industry,  which  we measure  by
employment level at the beginning of  the sample.  There  is a substantial fixed cost component
to filing an AD  suit, which  a large industry can share  over  a greater number of firms  and
employees to reduce the per firm and per employee suit filing cost.  This in turn means that
less per firm expected benefits are necessary to trigger an AD  suit petition, making process
filing more likely.  The final variable is the import penetration ratio  at the beginning of the
sample.  We expect larger values of this variable to be associated with higher probabilities  of
process filing.  Unless firms are faced with substantial import competition there is very little
reduction  in  domestic  output  due to  these  imports  and  therefore  only  a  small  benefit  to
reducing the flow of these imports.  Consequently,  the firms in the industry will have little
incentive to concern themselves with pursuing temporary protection through AD law.
The  unrestricted  form of our two-strategy  model  allowed  for  the  existence  of two
separate  joint  distributions  of filings,  imports,  and  domestic  output,  conditional  on the
unobservable latent variable yi.  It placed no restrictions  on which variables enter the filing
rate  function  for  either  strategy.  It  also  placed  no  restrictions  on  signs  and  relative
magnitudes of the coefficients for the five indicator variables in the mean function for imports
and  domestic  output  for  either  strategy.  Finally,  our  unrestricted  model  placed  no
restrictions on how observable characteristics of the industry affect the probability it is using
either  of the  two filing  strategies.  If certain  parameter  restrictions  consistent  with  our
outcome/process  filer dichotomy can be imposed on this unrestricted two-strategy  model,
then we can conclude that there is evidence for the simultaneous  existence  of these two kinds
of filers.
The coefficient estimates in filing rate model, and the import and output models obtained
in Staiger and Wolak (1994)  differ across the two filing  strategies in the manner predicted  by
our previous  discussion of the outcome  and process filing  strategies.  Evidence  consistent
with the  co-existence  of outcome  and process filers  is that:  1]  the restrictions  on which
variables enter into the process and outcome filing equations are not rejected by the data; and
2] the sign restrictions on the coefficients associated with our five petition-stage variables are
not  rejected  for the import and  domestic  output equations.  Table  1 provides  means  and
standard deviations for the variables used in the Staiger  and Wolak (1994)  analysis.
Table 2 presents the coefficient  estimates for the Probability of Process Filer equation.
Because we assume that pr(yi = 1) has a probit form, the coefficients  associated with the three
regressors have the same interpretation as those from a probit model.  The estimates imply
that the probability an industry is a process filer is increasing in the percentage  of all workers
in the industry that are unionized in 1979, the level of industry-wide employment  in 1979, and
240Table 1.  Means  and standard errors of variables  used  in  the  Staiger and Wolak
(1994)  analysis
2028 Year-Industr  Observations  (i=1,...,N=338 industries and t=1,. ..,T=6 years)
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__~~LITable 2.  Probability of process  filer model results
N = 338 Industries
Variable  Coefficient  Estimate  Sample Average
(Standard Error)  Probability Elasticity
_(Standard  Error)
UNION79  0.012  0.85
(0.006)  (0.32)
EMP79  0.004  0.36
(0.001)  (0.05)
IMPEN79  1.297  0.27
(0.531)  (0.08)
the import penetration ratio for this industry in 1979.  To provide magnitudes which are more
amenable to interpretation,  we compute the average  over all 338 industries  in our sample.
These  can be interpreted  as the percentage  increase  in the probability  that industry  i is  a
process filer brought about by a one percent increase in that variable.
The first  and second  columns  of Table  3 present the filing  equation  estimates  for the
outcome and process filing strategies.  All of the variables enter in the manner predicted by
the outcome filing strategy.  The filing equation excludes all variables but two lags of  CAPU
consistent with the process filing strategy.  The addition of the remaining three regressors,
IMPEN,  EMP,  and  VADD/OUT, to this equation did not  add  any statistically  significant
explanatory power to the model (the likelihood ratio test does not reject the null hypothesis
that these three coefficients are jointly zero).  This result lends support to the presence of two
distinct filing strategies.
Table 4 presents the import and output equations for both filing  strategies.  The results
for the outcome filer model yield investigation effects similar to the effects predicted by the
outcome filing strategy outlined previously.  The results for the process filer model present
a different story of the impacts of AD suits on imports  and output.  All of the investigation
effects beyond simply the filing of an AD suit are considerably smaller  in absolute value and
quite  imprecisely  estimated.  The  only  investigation  effect  which  seems  present  is  that
predicted by the process filing strategy.  Under this strategy, the filing of an AD suit predicts
an immediate reduction in the rate of imports and an increase  in the rate of domestic output.
The remaining  stages of the process appear to have  little impact  on the rate  of imports or
domestic output.  Even the impact of AD duties, although estimated to be trade-restricting,
is not very precisely estimated.
242Table 3.  Filing rate equation estimates from the two filing strategy model
N = 338 Industries for T = 6 Years
_________________  Coefficient  Estimate (Standard Error)









































I  ,  .Table 4.  Import and output equation  estimates from the two filing strategy model
N = 338 Industries for T =6 Years
Coefficient Estimate (Standard Error)
Outcome Filer Model  Process Filer Model
Import  Output  Import  Output










































































I .. IFigure 2 provides depictions of the import, output,  and the sum of imports  and output
effects of various  hypothetical  petitions implied  by the estimation  results for the two filing
strategies.  The figures, which  are meant only to be  suggestive of the  kind of import  and
output  effects  that  might  accompany  an  AD  investigation,  are  constructed  under  the
assumption that the preliminary LTFV determination  occurs 5 months into the investigation,
and  final  determinations  (if they  occur  at  all)  occur  at  the  end of the  12th month  of the
investigation.  These timing assumptions approximate  the statutory limits  imposed  on the
different phases of the investigation process in the absence of "extraordinary  complications."
All import and output effects are measured as deviations from zero.  Panel a depicts the effect
on the levels of imports, output,  and the sum of imports and output of a petition that is filed
by an outcome filer in month 6, receives  an affirmative preliminary LTFV determination  in
month  11,  and a negative final determination  in month  18.  Panel b  depicts the import,  output
and net import and output effect for the same investigation history when filed by a process
filer.  As Figure 2 depicts, there appears to be a striking  difference in the pattern of import,
output and net response to the various phases of the  investigation  process  across the two
filing strategies  in a way that is consistent with our outcome and process filer interpretations.
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Figure 2.  Effects  of a hypothetical petition on import and output values  and their sum.
a.  The petition is filed.
b.  An affirmative preliminary LTFV determination is made.











rae  . ucm  srtgThe  net  effect  results  for  outcome  filers  indicate  significantly  negative  net  import
reduction and output enhancement  effects from the ongoing preliminary less than fair value
and ongoing duty stages of the suit resolution process under the outcome filing strategy, and
hence net domestic consumer welfare losses (Table 5).  The net effect results for process filers
imply that the only nonzero net effect is the large OGPitGit effect (Table  5).  This indicates
a substantial net import and output reduction from the filing of a petition under the process
filing strategy.  Consequently,  there are also welfare losses to domestic consumers under the
process filing strategy.  More importantly these welfare losses result from the filing of an AD
petition which is evidently motivated by a desire to secure the trade restricting  effects of the
investigation alone.
Table 5.  Import net effects  from the two filing strategy model
Coefficient Estimate (Standard Error)
Outcome  Filer  Process Filer
Variable  Model  Model
OGPit/Git  9.33  -15.63
(6.14)  (6.38)
OGPLFVi/Git  -38.85  0.45
(15.37)  (3.29)
OGSUSit/Git  22.77  1.09
(17.82)  (3.84)
OGWDit/Git  10.05  1.26
(12.03)  (4.32)
OGDit/Git  -9.14  -2.49
(4.36)  (2.13)
Although as emphasized  at the beginning  of this section, the filing strategy pursued by a
given industry is a unobservable,  our model does allow the computation of the probability that
an industry  is a process filer given the estimated parameters  of our econometric  model and
the vector  zi from the equation:
K
pr(y  =  I  j  z 1 )  = _,  k(z/a  +  Ok).  (2)
k=l
The sample average of these probabilities gives an estimate of the proportion of industries
pursuing the process filing strategy.  For our parameter estimates, the sample average of the
probability that an industry is a process filer is 3.5 percent.  Assuming the validity of our two
strategy model, this implies that approximately  10 industries in our sample are process filers,
with the vast majority being outcome filers.  This is consistent with our  initial view that
outcome filing is the major use of AD law.
To further investigate the implications of our two filing strategy model we computed the
value of (2)  for  all observations  in our sample  and ranked  industries by the probability  of
246being a process filer.  The three highest probability  process filer industries  are:  SIC-3312,
Blast Furnaces,  steel works, and rolling mills; SIC-3714, Motor vehicle parts  and accessories;
and SIC-3711, Motor vehicles and passenger car bodies.  Other notable industries  in the top
ten highest probability process filer category  are:  SIC-3721,  Aircraft;  and  SIC-3662, Radio
and television  transmitting,  signaling  and detection  equipment  and apparatus.12  Once we
move outside the ten highest probability process filer industries, the probability that any of the
remaining industries is a process filer falls rapidly from  less than  10 percent to 0.7 percent.
Consequently,  all  of the  remaining  industries  have  a  very  low  estimated  probability  of
following the process filing strategy.
Finally, recall that as we have defined them, outcome filers initiate suits primarily to obtain
the protection that  comes with a finding of dumping and the explicit remedies  that follow
(duties or suspension agreements).  On the other hand, process filers are primarily interested
in the temporary protection afforded by the AD suit resolution process and do not file with
the intent of eventually obtaining  explicit remedies.  Thus, a final implication of the process
filing strategy  is that the rate of duties per suit filed should be  substantially  lower for the
process filers relative to the  outcome filers.  To investigate this hypothesis  we took the ten
highest  probability  process  filer  industries  and  computed  the  sum  of OGDit  over  these
industries for all six years in our sample.  We then divided this sum by the sum of fit over these
same industries for all  six years in our sample.  This ratio gives the per-suit level  of duty
activity for this process  filer sample.  We repeated  this same  calculation  for the remaining
observations in our sample to compute the per-suit level of duty activity for this outcome filer
sample.  Dividing the process filer ratio by the outcome filer ratio yields 5.5.  This indicates
that, for our sample,  a product level AD suit is  5.5 times more likely to end in duties for an
outcome  filer  than  for  one  of our ten  highest  probability  process  filers.  This  result  is
consistent with the view that process filers file less for the eventual protection provided by
duties than do outcome filers.
ITC Injury Determination Method and the Viability of the Process Filing Strategy
The  ITC is an independent  quasi-judicial  body composed  of six commissioners.  The
positions on the Commission are usually split equally between the two major political parties,
although  occasionally  Commissioners  with  no  political  affiliation  have  served.  The
Commission's chairmanship  also alternates between the two political parties.  In making its
1 2Although we would like to caution that these probabilities are conditional on the validity of
both our underlying process  filer theory and our econometric  model,  anecdotal  evidence
seems to supports the plausibility of these results.  For example, concerning  the filing behavior
of the steel  industry (the industry most likely according to our results to be a process  filer)
The Economist writes:
One lawyer  who  specializes  in international trade says that, for a struggling
mill, $400,000 to bring an antidumping suit is money  well-spent,  even without
a final ruling; the process gums up the trade gears sufficiently to steer buyers
back to domestic  steel.
247material  injury determination,  the ITC is instructed to consider  the impact of the dumped
imports on factors including  output, sales,  profits, investment,  employment,  output growth,
and capacity utilization.  However,  each commissioner has discretion as to how  he or she  uses
this  information to  determine  whether the  injury  suffered  exceeds  his  or her  subjective
material injury threshold.
There has been  some  research  assessing  the impact  of political  influence  on the  ITC
decisionmaking  process.  The  evidence  to date  is most consistent  with the view  that the
economic  factors outlined  above  are the primary predictors of the ITC's decisions.  Moore
analyzes  all individual commissioner's  votes for a sample  of cases  from  1980 to  1986 and
finds  evidence  consistent  with the  view  that  commissioners  make  their  injury  decisions
according to the criteria set forth in the enabling legislation.  In particular, he finds that falling
production and increased volumes  of alleged  dumped imports are the primary factors in the
commissioner's  decisions.  He does  however,  find evidence  that political  variables, primarily
petitions involving  the constituencies  of the Senate trade subcommittees,  can  increase the
probability of affirmative commissioner  votes.  Hansen also finds  that favorable ITC decisions
are  more  likely  if  an  industry  has  plants  in  the  districts  of  key  members  of  Congress.
Anderson  calls  into question these results from the Hansen and Moore  studies.  His most
damaging criticism is that these studies lack the relevant economic  variables in the model  to
predict ITC decisions.  Anderson  finds,  in a model  which  includes  all  relevant  economic
variables used by commissioners  to determine injury to the domestic  industry from dumping,
several of these variables are very important predictors of the ITC decision.  He  also finds that
the addition to the model of political  variables similar to those used by Hansen and Moore  do
not significantly improve the predictive power of his model  of ITC decisionmaking.  In light
of this evidence,  it  is  reasonable  to  conclude  that the  ITC  injury determination process
functions  in a manner that is consistent with the directives given  in the enabling  legislation.
There  are two  primary methods,  incorporating these  economic  variables  the  ITC is
directed to look at, used by individual commissioners  to make their injury determination.  The
historically  more  popular approach is the  so-called  bifurcation  or trends approach.  The
second  approach, which has become  more practical with the advent of increases in computing
technology,  is the unitary (or but for) approach.  This approach is also been referred to as the
comparative effects or comparative statics approach (Anderson  1992).  Boltuck provides a
complete  discussion  of these two  approaches.
Bifurcation or Trends Analysis Approach
The bifurcation or trends approach must answer two questions  affirmatively in order to
obtain a positive injury decision.  The first is whether or not the US  industry making the like-
product is materially injured.  In particular, is the industry financially or otherwise unhealthy,
or in declining health?  Indications of declining health are such things as low profit rates, low
rates of capacity utilization or low  levels  of output.  Declining  trends in these variables  are
also important indicators of declining health of the like-product domestic industry.  Answering
this question is called the "injury test" portion of the overall injury determination.
248If the industry is materially injured,  or more precisely in poor or declining  financial  health,
the bifurcated or trends approach, then asks whether the alleged  dumped imports have made
more than a de minimus contribution to the industry's condition.  Answering this question is
called the "causation test."  It applies a contributory causation  standard, which permits a large
fraction of the injury to be caused by factors other than the alleged dumped imports.
Two  aspects  of the trends  analysis  or bifurcation  approach  are  that  commissioners
applying this approach put substantial weight on the US industry's current financial  condition
and trends  in financial performance.  A crucial feature of the causation test is the existence
of a positive  "margin of underselling" which is defined as (PD  - PI)/P,  were PD is the price of
the  domestic  like-product  and  PI is  the  price of the imported  good  sold  in the  US.  As
discussed previously, commissioners  relying on this approach look for a relationship between
a positive or increasing margin of underselling and increases in the market  share of the alleged
dumped imports in order to affirmatively  answer the causation question.  This is in keeping
with the directives  of AD that the material injury must be by reason of the subject imports.
Unitary or "But  for" Approach
The unitary approach can be thought of as evolving from  a literal interpretation  of the
directive of the enabling legislation that the injury measured must be directly  attributable to
the imports under investigation.  It is also motivated by developments  in the construction and
solution of economic simulation models.  The unitary approach asks whether the US industry
would have been materially better off "but for" the sales of the dumped imports.  If so, then
the industry is materially injured by reason of imports.  Thus, the distinguishing feature of this
approach it that it compares the condition of the US industry in the presence  of "dumped"
imports  with an  analytic  estimate  of the  condition of the  industry were  such imports not
present.  To compute the condition of the market in the absence of these "dumped"  imports,
the  commissioners  use  an  economic  simulation  model  embodying  the  relevant  behavior
parameters  for that industry.
Most  commissioners  who  have  used  the  unitary  approach  have  interpreted  the
counterfactual absence of dumped imports to be equivalent to the absence of the underlying
unfair trade practice, but not the absence of the allegedly dumped imports.  The distinction
here is that the elimination of the unfair trading practice would most likely not result in the
complete  elimination  of all  of imports.  Consequently,  removal  of all  allegedly  dumped
imports from the US market in a counterfactual  experiment would necessarily  confer greater
benefit to the US industry than simply the elimination of the alleged LTFV price.
Under the unitary approach, these estimates of the impacts of dumping on the US market
are obtained through the use of comparative  static economic models.  The most commonly
used model is ITC staffs Comparative Analysis of Domestic Industry Condition (CADIC)
model.  This  model  is  an  Armington-style  partial  equilibrium  model.  The  Armington
assumption is that consumers or industrial end users regard products as differentiated  based
on the nation of origin.  The models rely on market shares of foreign and domestic firms in
the US market, behavioral own- and cross-price  elasticities for imported and like-domestic
products, and the dumping margin.  According to Boltuck, submissions by both sides of the
249AD  investigation have increasingly focused  on defining reasonable,  empirically-supported
ranges for the required parameters.
Viability of the Process  Filing  Strategy
The unitary and bifurcated approaches  favor differing situations.  The unitary approach
favors an affirmative  outcome for US industries in a good or improving  financial condition.
The bifurcation approach necessarily finds a lack of injury in these instances, but the unitary
approach  still has a chance to demonstrate that US industry would have been better off but
for the dumped imports.  The unitary approach also favors those situations when the ITA has
reported  a large dumping margin,  regardless of whether this margin  is reflective of actual
practices,  because this variable is used to determine how much the import price must rise in
the counterfactual  calculation used to compute the industry equilibrium without the alleged
sales at LTFV.
Another  important  distinction  between the unitary  and  bifurcation  approaches  is  the
distinction  between  bilateral  price  reductions  and  unilateral  price  reductions.  In  the
bifurcation approach  it important that unilateral price reductions  by imports occur in order
for the positive margin of underselling necessary for an affirmative  answer to the causation
question.  If both the import  and domestic  like-product  prices  fall by the  same  amount, a
positive margin of underselling  will not exist and the an affirmative  answer to the causation
question will not be possible.  However,  for the unitary approach  the only issue is whether
any imports  are being sold  at less than  fair value  regardless  of level  of this import  price
relative to the domestic like-product price.  If  the imports that result from this LTFV import
price result in material injury to the domestic  industry, then the unitary approach would yield
a positive injury determination.
Because the bifurcation approach requires either poor or declining financial  health for the
domestic industry and the existence of a positive margin of underselling by the importing firm
for  an  affirmative  injury  determination,  it  is  ideally  suited  to  support  the  process  filing
strategy.  Recall that under the process filing strategy, US firms are attempting maintain prices
above  those  which would  exist  under  the  static  one-period  non-cooperative  equilibrium
between foreign and domestic firms given the current state of demand in the domestic market.
We would expect that maintaining these prices would be particularly difficult  in those periods
in  which  domestic  demand  is  particularly  low  and,  correspondingly,  when  the  domestic
industry is in poor or declining  health.  In these circumstances,  what the domestic industry
would like is a third-party to monitor and punish any price cuts designed to steal market  share
from  the  domestic  industry.  This  is  precisely  what  the ITC  does  under  the bifurcation
approach.
Because of the requirement of a positive margin of underselling that leads to a surge in
imports  and  hence  a  fall  in  the  market  share  of the  domestic  like-product,  the  injury
determination process using the bifurcation approach serves to monitor precisely the kind of
price-cutting behavior that these domestic firms would like insurance against.  Consequently,
in exchange for the cost of filing of an AD suit petition, process filers get insurance against
unilateral  price  cuts by the importer  during the investigation  phase that lead to surges  in
250imports and declines in the domestic market  share.  If the domestic industry was in poor or
declining  health (e.g.,  there was low demand for its product)  and the importer  engaged  in
these kinds of unilateral price cuts during the AD investigation process, commissioners  using
the bifurcation  approach would find material injury to domestic like-product  and given the
very  low  standard  for  sales at  LTFV  and the  biases  in  favor of an  affirmative  decision,
dumping duties would very likely follow.
Because it uses the "but for" criterion to assess injury, the unitary approach to assessing
injury is  not nearly  as conducive to the  process filing  strategy.  As  discussed  above,  the
unitary  approach  does  not require a  positive margin of underselling.  As  emphasized  by
Boltuck, dumping  can injure US producers even if imports oversell the US like product.  In
addition,  as  discussed  above,  poor  or  declining  health  of the domestic  industry  is  not  a
necessary condition for an affirmative  decision under the unitary approach.
Perhaps the most surprising  evidence that the unitary approach is less conducive to the
process filing strategy is that the US steel industry  (the industry  Staiger  and Wolak (1994)
estimates has the highest probability of being a process filer)  has challenged the legality of the
unitary approach  in the US Court of International Trade  [CIT].  According to Boltuck, the
steel petitioners charge that the CIT has approved only the contributory causation standard
that  underlies  the  bifurcation  approach  causation  test,  to  the  exclusion  of the  unitary
approach.  As discussed above,  it is precisely the bifurcation approach's causation test that
allows the process filing strategy to be viable.
Summary
Staiger and Wolak  (1994)  found evidence of two kinds of filing strategies:  "outcome"
filers who file petitions for the possibility of seeing duties imposed,  and "process"  filers who
file  for the trade-restrictive  effects  of the investigation  process  alone.  We also  were  able
compute the probability that each industry in our sample used each of these strategies.  Using
these  probabilities  we found  that the  steel  and motor  vehicle industries  were  among the
highest  probability  process  filer industries.  We  also  found  evidence  that  this  strategy is
pursued by a small fraction (less than 4 percent) of industries in our sample.
Given  this evidence in favor of the  process filing  strategy, we then asked the question,
what aspects of the ITC injury determination  process favor this strategy.  We argued that the
historically most popular trends or bifurcation  approach to injury determination supported the
process filing strategy.  Given our view that process filing is contrary to the intent of US law,
this paper provides further evidence  against the use of bifurcation  approach.  Because the
unitary or "but for" approach is not nearly as hospitable to the process filing strategy, this
paper also provides evidence for the expanded use of this approach to injury determination.
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